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Life provides an endless stream of social comparison information. Because opportunities to compare with others are so abundant,
social comparison theory traditionally assumes that people are selective in their comparison activities and primarily compare with
deliberately selected standards. Recent research, however, demonstrates that social comparisons often occur spontaneously, even if
no standard is explicitly provided or deliberately selected. We examined whether comparisons are so spontaneous that they are even
engaged if people are ﬂeetingly exposed to a potential standard—so ﬂeetingly that they remain unaware of the standard. In three
studies, participants were subliminally primed with moderate versus extreme, high versus low standards during self-evaluation.
Results demonstrate that self-evaluations are inﬂuenced by subliminally presented standards. Speciﬁcally, self-evaluations are as-
similated towards moderate standards and contrasted away from extreme standards. These self-evaluative consequences of subliminal
standards, however, were only obtained if participants engaged in self-reﬂection during standard exposure. These ﬁndings emphasize
that social comparisons are truly ubiquitous processes that are engaged even for ﬂeeting exposure to standard information.
 2004 Elsevier Inc. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.In their daily routines, people are constantly con-
fronted with information about the abilities, fortunes,
and weaknesses of others. In fact, life provides such an
endless stream of social comparison opportunities that
people may have a hard time to relate all of this infor-
mation to themselves. It is thus little surprising that one
of the cornerstones of social comparison theory and
research is the notion that people are selective in their
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standard. Rather, they are taken to select those stan-
dards for comparison that promise to provide valuable
information because they are similar to the self (Fest-
inger, 1954; Goethals & Darley, 1977; Miller, 1982; Suls,
Gastorf, & Lawhon, 1978; Wheeler, 1966). Social com-
parisons are thus typically seen as involving a deliberate
standard selection process in which diﬀerent standards
are considered and the most appropriate one is selected.
Supplementing this traditional view, recent research
suggests that comparisons may not always be deliberate
processes that are strategically engaged. Oftentimes,
social comparisons simply happen. In fact, people
spontaneously compare themselves even with clearly
irrelevant standards (Gilbert, Giesler, & Morris, 1995).
This suggests that social comparisons may be so natural
and eﬀortless that they are carried out even if the com-
parison oﬀers little valuable information.
What are the limits of this inclination to spontane-
ously compare with others? Are potential standards al-
ready used for comparison, if social judges are only
ﬂeetingly exposed to them? Imagine, for example, that
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the gym you hear somebody mention the name of Mi-
chael Jordan? Does such a ﬂeeting exposure to a po-
tential comparison standard inﬂuence self-evaluations of
your athletic abilities? In the present research, we pu-
shed this question a little further and examined whether
a standard to whom exposure was so ﬂeeting that—
phenomenologically—he was not even there, is used for
comparison. Do people compare themselves with a
standard who was not consciously perceived because he
was presented outside of awareness? To ﬁnd out, we
subliminally primed participants who were engaging in
self-evaluation with the names of potential social com-
parison standards. If such subliminal standards are in-
deed used for comparison, then this would be apparent
in an inﬂuence on subsequent self-evaluations. Com-
parisons with others change the way we see and evaluate
ourselves (Morse & Gergen, 1970) so that changes in
self-evaluation can be used as an indicator of social
comparison activities.
In fact, the direction of these self-evaluative com-
parison consequences appears to be highly variable in
that sometimes self-evaluations are assimilated toward a
given standard and sometimes they are contrasted away
from the standard (e.g., Brewer & Weber, 1994; Brown,
Novick, Lord, & Richards, 1992; Buunk, Collins, Tay-
lor, VanYperen, & Dakof, 1990; Lockwood & Kunda,
1997; Mussweiler & Bodenhausen, 2002; Pelham &
Wachsmuth, 1995; for an overview and theoretical in-
tegration, see Mussweiler, 2003). One of the critical
moderators that determine whether assimilation or
contrast results as a comparison consequence, is stan-
dard extremity. We have recently demonstrated that in
deliberate social comparison self-evaluations are assim-
ilated towards explicitly provided moderate standards
and contrasted away from extreme standards (Mus-
sweiler, R€uter, & Epstude, in press). This is the case,
because for both types of standards people seek and
activate diﬀerent subsets of self-knowledge during the
comparison process (Mussweiler, 2003). Comparisons
with moderate standards involve a comparison process
of similarity testing which increases the accessibility of
knowledge indicating that self and standard are similar.
In comparing their athletic abilities to a moderate
standard like Bill Clinton, for example, participants
consider the possibility that they are as athletic as the
former US president and selectively search for infor-
mation that is consistent with this assumption. Com-
parisons with extreme standards, however, involve a
comparison process of dissimilarity testing which in-
creases the accessibility of knowledge indicating that self
and standard are diﬀerent. In comparing their athletic
abilities to an extreme standard like Michael Jordan, for
example, considering the possibility that one may be as
athletic as the former basketball professional makes
little sense, so that people instead selectively search forinformation indicating that their athletic ability is dif-
ferent from Michael Jordan. Consistent with this as-
sumption, we have recently demonstrated that judges
assimilated self-evaluations of their athletic abilities to
the moderate standard Bill Clinton, and contrasted
away from the extreme standard Michael Jordan
(Mussweiler et al., in press). As is true for social judg-
ment in general (e.g., Herr, 1986), self-evaluations were
thus assimilated to moderate standards and contrasted
away from extreme standards. Would this inﬂuence of
standard extremity on the direction of comparison
consequences also hold for subliminal standards? We
examined these questions in three experiments. Studies 1
and 3 focus on the eﬀects of moderate subliminal stan-
dards. Study 2 examines the eﬀects of moderate and
extreme standards.Study 1
If subliminally presented standards are used for social
comparison, then this would be apparent in their inﬂu-
ence on subsequent self-evaluations. Comparisons with
moderate standards typically yield assimilative self-
evaluative consequences, so that the self is evaluated to
be higher on the critical dimension after a comparison
with a moderately high rather than a moderately low
standard (see, Mussweiler, 2003; Mussweiler et al., in
press; Mussweiler & Strack, 2000). In Study 1, partici-
pants were subliminally primed with either a moderately
high or low standard of aggressiveness while evaluating
themselves on this dimension.
Method
Participants
We recruited 32 students at the University of
W€urzburg as participants. They were contacted over
phone, asked to participate in a series of unrelated ex-
perimental studies that would last for a total of 1 h, and
oﬀered a compensation of Euro 6.
Materials and procedure
Upon arrival in the lab, participants were led to in-
dividual booths and seated in front of computer moni-
tors. Instructions informed them that their task was to
engage in a series of self-evaluations. Speciﬁcally, they
would be asked to evaluate their aggressiveness by
making a series of judgments. Before making these
judgments they were instructed to ﬁrst reﬂect on their
aggressiveness and consider how aggressive they were
for about 1 min. To ostensibly help them concentrate on
this question, we instructed participants to focus their
attention on a letter string that was presented in the
center of the screen. This ﬁxation string was presented
for 3000ms and was replaced by the name of the social
1 Note that z values do not add up to 0 because of uneven cell sizes.
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immediately masked by the same letter string that was
again presented for 3000ms. This sequence was repeated
10 times, so that participants were subliminally exposed
to the potential comparison standard 10 times, while
reﬂecting on their aggressiveness for about 1min. Half
of the participants were exposed to the name of a
moderately high standard of aggressiveness (the German
TV-detective Schimanski), the other half with a mod-
erately low standard (the German pop-singer Guildo
Horn). Both standards were pretested in a separate
study in which 21 participants rated the aggressiveness
of themselves and a series of potential standards on a 9-
point scale (1¼ not at all aggressive, 9¼ very aggres-
sive). Based on the results of this pretest, moderate
standards were selected so that the mean self-rating
(M ¼ 3:2) was in between mean ratings for the moder-
ately low (M ¼ 2:2) and the moderately high standard
(M ¼ 5:4).
After the priming task, participants proceeded with a
series of self-evaluative judgments. Previous research
has demonstrated that ‘‘objective’’ (Biernat, Manis, &
Nelson, 1991) or absolute judgments allow for a less
biased assessment that more directly reﬂects the repre-
sentational consequences of comparison (Mussweiler &
Strack, 2000) than ‘‘subjective’’ (Biernat et al., 1991) or
dimensional judgments (for a more elaborate discussion,
see Mussweiler, 2003). Using such absolute judgments,
participants were asked to imagine that they got into a
ﬁght with a friend and to estimate the likelihood (%)
that they would engage in each of the following ag-
gressive behaviors: calling names, insulting, and getting
physically violent. For example, participants gave their
best percentage estimate of the likelihood that they
would insult their friend.
We used a funneled debrieﬁng method to test for
participants awareness of the primes (Bargh, Chen, &
Burrows, 1996). Participants answered a series of seven
awareness check questions which progressively revealed
the true nature of the priming task: (1) Did you notice
anything special in this study?, (2) What do you think this
study was about?, (3) Did you notice anything special with
the ﬁxation string?, (4) Did you notice that presentation of
this letter string was interrupted?, (5) Do you have any
idea of what the interruptions consisted?, (6) In fact, the
ﬁxation letter string was interrupted by the very brief
presentation of words. Were you able detect these words?,
and (7) Please write down the words you detected.
Results and discussion
Analyses of the awareness check questions revealed
that none of the participants were skeptical about the
procedure, inferred the actual purpose of the study, or
were able to report the standard names that were pre-
sented. One participant indicated that the ﬁxation stringmay have been interrupted by the presentation of an-
other word but was unable to name the word. Because it
is not entirely clear whether for this participant, the
standard remained subliminal, we excluded her from
further analyses.
We z-transformed answers to the self-evaluative
judgments and averaged them into one aggressiveness
score (Cronbach’s a ¼ :85).
We expected self-evaluations to be assimilated to-
wards the subliminally presented comparison standards.
In light of our previous research demonstrating that
deliberate comparisons with explicitly provided moder-
ate standards yield assimilative self-evaluative conse-
quences, we expected the same to be true for subliminal
standards. Our results are consistent with these expec-
tations. Indeed, self-evaluations were assimilated to-
wards the subliminally presented comparison standards:
participants presented with the high standard evaluated
themselves to be more aggressive (M ¼ :32), than those
presented with the low standard (M ¼ :30),1
tð29Þ ¼ 2:1, p < :05 (two-tailed).
These ﬁndings demonstrate that social comparison
standards which are presented outside of participants
awareness inﬂuence self-evaluations. As is true for de-
liberate comparisons (e.g., Mussweiler & Strack, 2000),
our participants assimilated evaluations of their char-
acteristics and abilities towards the subliminally pre-
sented moderate standards. A potential standard may
thus be used for social comparison, even if standard
exposure is so ﬂeeting that people remain unaware of it.
Would comparisons with such ﬂeeting standards de-
pend on the same standard characteristics that critically
shape more deliberate comparison processes? Our pre-
vious research suggests that one such important char-
acteristic is standard extremity (Mussweiler et al., in
press). Whether deliberate comparisons with explicitly
provided standards involve the comparison processes of
similarity or dissimilarity testing (Mussweiler, 2003) and
whether they consequently lead to assimilation or con-
trast critically depends on the extremity of the standard
(Mussweiler et al., in press). Does this also hold for
subliminal standards? Are self-evaluations assimilated
towards moderate standards and contrasted away
from extreme standards, as is the case for deliberate
social comparisons? Study 2 was designed to examine
this question concerning the direction of comparison
consequences.Study 2
To do so, participants were subliminally primed with
a high versus low comparison standard that was either
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themselves on this dimension.
Method
Participants
We recruited 55 students at the University of
W€urzburg as participants under the same conditions
described in Study 1.
Materials and procedures
Procedures were similar to those applied in Study 1,
with the exception of the self-evaluative dimension
(athletic abilities) and the social comparison standards.
This time, participants were asked to reﬂect upon their
athletic abilities for about 1min. Furthermore, while
doing so, we subliminally presented participants with
one of four standards of athletic ability using the same
procedure as in Study 1: a moderately low standard (the
former US president Bill Clinton), a moderately high
standard (the former race car driver Nicki Lauda), an
extremely low standard (Pope John Paul), or an ex-
tremely high standard (the former basketball profes-
sional Michael Jordan). All of these standards have been
used in our previous research on self-evaluative conse-
quences of deliberate comparisons (Mussweiler &
Strack, 2000; Mussweiler et al., in press). Moreover,
based on the results of a pretest (N ¼ 21), the moderate
standards were selected so that the mean self-rating
(M ¼ 5:2) was in between mean ratings for the moder-
ately low (M ¼ 3:9) and the moderately high standard
(M ¼ 6:8). Subsequent to the standard priming, partic-
ipants evaluated their athletic abilities using absolute
judgments. They indicated the maximum number of
push-ups they can perform as well as the minimum time
they need to run 100m. Finally, they answered the same
awareness check questions as before.
Results and discussion
One of the participants indicated that he had detected
one of the prime words but was unable to report it.
Because it is not entirely clear whether primes remained
subliminal for this participant, he was excluded from
further analyses.
We excluded those estimates from the analyses that
were completely unrealistic. In particular, running time
estimates that were below the world record (10 s), or
above walking speed (60 s) as well as estimates of more
than 100 push-ups were excluded.2 We z-transformed,
partly reverse scored (running time) and averaged the
remaining responses into one athletic abilities score
(Cronbach’s a ¼ :48).2 Including these outliers did not change the obtained pattern of
means.We expected participants self-evaluations to depend
on the subliminally presented social comparison stan-
dards. More speciﬁcally, our ﬁndings for deliberate so-
cial comparisons with explicitly provided standards
suggest that self-evaluations may be assimilated towards
moderate standards and contrasted away from extreme
standards. Inspection of Fig. 1 reveals that the self-
evaluative consequences of social comparison with
subliminal standards did indeed critically depend on
standard extremity. As was true in Study 1, participants
assimilated self-evaluations toward moderate compari-
son standards and evaluated themselves to be more
athletic if they had been exposed to the moderately high
standard (M ¼ :31) rather than the moderately low
standard (M ¼ :26), tð50Þ ¼ 1:7, p < :09 (two-tailed).
However, participants contrasted self-evaluations away
from the extreme standards, and evaluated themselves to
be less athletic if they had been exposed to the extremely
high standard (M ¼ :25) rather than the extremely low
standard (M ¼ :32), tð50Þ ¼ 1:8, p < :08 (two-tailed).
This pattern was borne out in a signiﬁcant interaction
eﬀect in an ANOVA using participants athletic abilities
scores as the dependent measure, F ð1; 50Þ ¼ 6:1,
p < :02.
These ﬁndings indicate that how subliminal standards
inﬂuence self-evaluations depends on their extremity.
Subliminal exposure to moderate standards has assimi-
lative self-evaluative consequences, whereas extreme
standards yield contrast.
Taken together, the results of Studies 1 and 2 dem-
onstrate that subliminal exposure to social comparison
standards can inﬂuence self-evaluations. Social com-
parisons may thus even be engaged with a potential
standard who was only ﬂeetingly present—so ﬂeetingly
that participants remained unaware of it. Notably, one
precondition may have to be fulﬁlled for such self-
evaluative eﬀects of social comparison standards to oc-
cur. In both studies, participants were in the process of
reﬂecting upon their own qualities during standard ex-
posure. Doing so may ensure that the comparison
standards are related to the self immediately upon theirFig. 1. Self-evaluations of athletic ability (z-transformed) of partici-
pants who were subliminally exposed to a moderate versus extreme,
high versus low social comparison standard (Study 2).
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of two concepts is an important precondition of com-
parison activity (Kruglanski & Mayseless, 1990). Re-
ﬂecting upon the self while being exposed to a social
comparison standard ensures that both are accessible at
the same time and consequently increases the likelihood
of comparison. In this respect, self-reﬂection about ones
standing on the critical dimension may well be a nec-
essary precondition for the obtained eﬀects to occur.
Study 3 was designed to examine whether a subliminally
presented social comparison standard only inﬂuences
self-evaluation, if participants are self-reﬂecting during
standard exposure.Study 3
To do so, we manipulated whether participants were
reﬂecting about their own standing on the judgmental
dimension or about the nature of this dimension when
exposed to the comparison standard. More speciﬁcally,
participants were either asked to think about their own
aggressiveness or about the concept of aggressiveness as
such. The above reasoning suggests that self-reﬂection
during standard exposure may be a necessary pre-
condition for the eﬀects of subliminal standards. If this
is the case, then self-evaluations should only be inﬂu-
enced by the subliminally presented standards, if par-
ticipants are reﬂecting on their own aggressiveness
during standard exposure. Self-evaluations should re-
main uninﬂuenced, however, if participants are reﬂect-
ing on the dimension of aggressiveness during standard
exposure.
Method
Participants
We recruited 47 students at the University of
W€urzburg as participants. They were contacted in the
University cafeteria, led to a separate room and oﬀered
a chocolate bar as a compensation.
Materials and procedure
Upon arrival in the lab, participants were led to in-
dividual booths and seated in front of computer moni-
tors. Instructions informed them that they were to
engage in a series of evaluation tasks concerning the
dimension of aggressiveness. More speciﬁcally, they
would be asked a series of questions that pertained to
the general concept of aggressiveness and some related
topics. About half of the participants were then asked to
reﬂect upon their own aggressiveness and consider how
aggressive they are for about 1min. The other half were
asked to reﬂect upon the general concept of aggres-
siveness and consider which aspects this concept in-
cludes. As in the previous studies, we instructedparticipants to focus on a ﬁxation string that was pre-
sented in the center of the screen during the reﬂection.
To further ensure the subliminal nature of our primes,
we somewhat modiﬁed our procedures. The ﬁxation
string was replaced by the name of the social compari-
son standard that was presented for 33ms and imme-
diately masked. A total of 6 diﬀerent ﬁxation strings
(e.g., &$§?#ß#§$%@&%, #?ß$§&§?%ß?&§) was pre-
sented before and after the prime. The number and
presentation times of these ﬁxation strings were varied.
Speciﬁcally, between 2 and 4 diﬀerent masks were pre-
sented for 500, 800 or 1000ms before and after the
prime. Fixation strings were thus presented for between
1800 and 3300ms before and after the prime. We have
used similar masking procedures in our research (Mus-
sweiler & Englich, 2004) and have repeatedly found that
it successfully ensures the subliminal nature of the
primes. This sequence was repeated 10 times, so that
participants were subliminally exposed to the name of a
potential comparison standard for 10 times. About half
of the participants were exposed to the name of a
moderately high standard of aggressiveness (the former
actor Arnold Schwarzenegger), the other half with a
moderately low standard (the German pop-singer
Nena). Both standards were pretested in the separate
study described before (N ¼ 21) in which their aggres-
siveness was rated to be similar to that of the standards
used in Study 1 (M ¼ 5:7 for Schwarzenegger and
M ¼ 2:3 for Nena).
After the priming task, participants evaluated their
own aggressiveness using the same absolute judgments
as in Study 1. To keep up the cover story about our
ostensible interest in the general concept of aggressive-
ness, participants then listed three core aspects of ag-
gressiveness. Finally, we again used a funneled
debrieﬁng to test for participants awareness of the
primes.
Results and discussion
Analyses of the awareness check questions revealed
that none of the participants were able to report the
standard names that were presented. We z-transformed
answers to the self-evaluative questions and averaged
them into one aggressiveness score (Cronbach’s a ¼ :67).
We expected participants self-evaluations to depend
on the subliminally presented social comparison
standards as well as the type of reﬂection they engaged
in during exposure to these standards. More speciﬁcally,
the results of the previous studies indicate that self-
evaluations should be assimilated to the moderate
comparison standards used in Study 3. This assimilation
eﬀect, however, may be primarily apparent for
participants who reﬂected about their aggressiveness.
Inspection of Fig. 2 reveals that the self-evaluative con-
sequences of subliminal exposure to social comparison
Fig. 2. Self-evaluations of aggressiveness (z-transformed) of partici-
pants who were subliminally exposed to a moderate high versus low
social comparison standard while reﬂecting on the self versus the
critical dimension (Study 3).
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process. Consistent with the results of Studies 1 and 2,
participants who reﬂected upon their own aggressiveness
evaluated themselves to be more aggressive after expo-
sure to a moderately high standard (M ¼ :54) than after
exposure to a moderately low standard (M ¼ :36),
tð43Þ ¼ 3:1, p < :01 (two-tailed). Participants who re-
ﬂected upon the general concept of aggressiveness,
however, remained uninﬂuenced by the subliminal
standards (M ¼ :11 versus M ¼ :07), tð43Þ < 1. This
pattern was borne out in a signiﬁcant interaction eﬀect in
an ANOVA using participants aggressiveness scores as
the dependent measure, F ð1; 43Þ ¼ 4:97, p < :03.
These ﬁndings demonstrate that self-evaluations of
aggressiveness were only inﬂuenced by subliminally
presented standards, if participants were reﬂecting upon
their own aggressiveness during standard exposure.
When reﬂecting about the concept of aggressiveness per
se, self-evaluations remained uninﬂuenced by the pre-
sented standards. This suggests that self-reﬂection dur-
ing standard exposure may indeed be a necessary
precondition for the self-evaluative eﬀects of subliminal
standards to occur.General discussion
Taken together, the present ﬁndings indicate that—
under speciﬁc conditions—subliminal exposure to social
comparison standards inﬂuences self-evaluations. Stan-
dards who—from the judges perspective—are not even
there, sometimes still appear to be used for comparison.
These ﬁndings demonstrate that social comparisons can
be engaged even with comparison standards to whom
people have been exposed rather ﬂeetingly. Self-evalua-
tive comparisons are thus not only engaged with stan-
dards who have been explicitly provided or deliberately
selected. Rather, they can be spontaneously carried out
even under conditions of minimal exposure. Notably,
Study 2 demonstrates that subliminal standards caneven be used for comparison if they are maximally dif-
ferent from the self. The extreme standards Michael
Jordan and Pope John Paul do not only diﬀer from our
participants on the critical dimension itself, but also on
salient comparison-related attributes (e.g., profession,
age, and ethnicity). Despite this striking dissimilarity,
participants compared themselves with these extreme
standards, as is evident in the standards inﬂuence on
self-evaluations. The fact that participants compared
with potential standards even if they were unaware of
them, and even if they were unlikely to yield valuable
information emphasizes that spontaneous social com-
parisons are truly ubiquitous.
At the same time, such spontaneous comparisons are
highly ﬂexible in that they do not invariably take the
same form and yield the same consequence. Depending
on the nature of the comparison standard, diﬀerent
comparison mechanisms with diverging consequences
are engaged. The assimilative versus contrastive conse-
quences of comparisons with moderate versus extreme
standards that we have obtained in the present research,
converge with similar ﬁndings on the consequences of
priming in social judgment (Herr, 1986) and the conse-
quences of deliberate comparisons with supraliminal
standards (Mussweiler et al., in press). This latter
research further demonstrates that these diverging self-
evaluative consequences are produced by the two
alternative comparison mechanisms of similarity and
dissimilarity testing (Mussweiler, 2003). In comparing
themselves to a moderate standard people selectively
seek and activate knowledge indicating that they are
similar to the standard. In comparing themselves to an
extreme standard, however, people selectively seek in-
formation indicating that they are diﬀerent from the
standard. The fact that spontaneous comparisons with
subliminal standards depend on standard extremity in
much the same way, suggests that they involve the same
comparison processes. The alternative comparison
mechanisms of similarity and dissimilarity testing thus
appear to be operating in deliberate and spontaneous
comparisons with standards that are explicitly provided,
deliberately selected, or subliminally presented.
The present research builds on previous work on the
spontaneity of social comparisons in a number of ways.
Gilbert et al. (1995) demonstrated that participants
spontaneously engage in social comparisons with irrel-
evant others. Our research extends these seminal ﬁnd-
ings in at least three important ways. In Gilbert et al.
(1995) participants evaluated themselves on novel di-
mensions (e.g., ability to detect schizophrenia) for which
they were unlikely to have alternative standards avail-
able. The present ﬁndings demonstrate that comparisons
with irrelevant standards are even spontaneously carried
out for self-evaluations on basic personality dimensions
(aggressiveness) and core abilities (athletic performance)
for which a multitude of alternative standards exist.
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very brief exposure can be suﬃcient for a standard to be
used for comparison. In Gilbert et al. (1995) participants
were extensively exposed to comparison information
while observing the potential standard perform the same
task that they were about to perform. In the present
studies, exposure to the standard was so brief that
participants remained unaware of it. Still—under speciﬁc
conditions—such ﬂeeting exposure to standard infor-
mation was suﬃcient to inﬂuence subsequent self-eval-
uations. Finally, the present research identiﬁes a
boundary condition for spontaneous social compari-
sons. In Study 3, subliminal exposure only inﬂuenced
self-evaluations, if participants reﬂected upon their own
qualities during standard presentation. Fleeting expo-
sure to a potential standard thus only appears to inﬂu-
ence self-evaluations if this standard can immediately be
related to the self. If this is not the case, because par-
ticipants work on a judgment task that does not directly
involve self-reﬂection, then subliminal standards are not
used for social comparison. This ﬁnding is consistent
with the notion that coaccessibility of two concepts is an
important precondition of comparison activity (Kru-
glanski & Mayseless, 1990). At the same time, previous
research has repeatedly demonstrated that primes may
inﬂuence target evaluations, even if judges do not reﬂect
on the judgmental target during standard exposure (e.g.,
Herr, 1986). Clearly, identifying the exact psychological
mechanisms that underlie this boundary condition is
beyond the scope of the present studies and bears fur-
ther examination by future research.
One core implication of this research is that people
may be less selective in their social comparison activities
than has traditionally been assumed (Festinger, 1954).
In our studies, ﬂeeting exposure to a potential standard
was suﬃcient to trigger social comparison. Such mini-
mal exposure, however, is a constant byproduct of many
daily routines. No matter whether we are ﬂipping
through a magazine, overhearing a conversation, or
watching television, we are constantly exposed to social
comparison information. The present ﬁndings suggest
that oftentimes, we may indeed relate this information
to ourselves. At the same time, these ﬁndings point to
one precondition that has to be fulﬁlled for social
comparison to be carried out. In the present studies,
subliminal standards only inﬂuenced self-evaluations if
participants were reﬂecting upon themselves when they
were presented with the standards. Fleetingly presented
social standards may thus only be used for comparison,
if people are in the process of self-reﬂection. Notably,
this often seems to be the case. In fact, people appear to
spend much of their time reﬂecting upon and evaluating
themselves. In one study (Csikszentmihalyi & Figurski,
1982), for example, about 8% of all thoughts partici-
pants had in the course of the day pertained to the self.
Self-evaluation thus appears to be one of our most fre-quent and prevalent mental activities. This pervasiveness
of self-evaluative thoughts together with the endless
stream of information about potential standards may
continuously engage people in social comparison activ-
ities. Spontaneous comparisons with others thus appear
to be a truly ubiquitous process.
In light of this ubiquity social comparisons have to be
highly eﬃcient processes. If people do indeed constantly
compare with others, then—to prevent cognitive over-
load—they can only use little processing capacities for
such comparisons. For a process that is engaged as
frequently as social comparison, proceduralization, and
automatization (Bargh, 1997; Dijksterhuis & Bargh,
2001; Smith, 1994) are important capacity saving devices
(Mussweiler & R€uter, 2003). As is true for other psy-
chological processes that are repeatedly engaged, social
comparisons are likely to become proceduralized so that
they can be carried out in relatively automatic ways.
This may enable people to constantly compare with
others, without draining too much of their scarce cog-
nitive resources.References
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